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Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: 
A Response to Professor Dressler 
 
 
Joan H. Krause* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections,1 Professor 
Joshua Dressler offers cogent criticism of the application of self-defense to 
battered women who kill their abusers under “nonconfrontational” circumstances, 
such as when the abuser is asleep.  Dressler is critical of using evidence that the 
defendant suffered from “Battered Woman Syndrome” (“BWS”) to establish the 
requisite defense elements, which historically have applied only in confrontational 
contexts.  According to Dressler’s critique, legislators, judges, and academics have 
far too easily accepted the proposition that the battered woman’s actions are 
morally justifiable, and have been far too willing to stretch the limits of the 
doctrine to accomplish this end.  Dressler asserts that “[t]he proposition that a 
battered woman is justified in killing her sleeping abuser, although well-meaning, 
is wrong, and . . . any serious effort to expand self-defense law . . . to permit such 
killings [risks] . . . the coarsening of our moral values about human life and, 
perhaps, even the condonation of homicidal vengeance.”2  In place of self-defense, 
Dressler proposes an expanded use of the duress doctrine to excuse rather than 
justify the battered woman’s actions, permitting society to condemn the killing 
while simultaneously acknowledging that the defendant lacked a “fair opportunity 
to conform her conduct to the dictates of the law.”3 
Although not explicitly stated, Dressler’s criticism appears to rest on three 
core assumptions: one moral, one factual, and one practical.  For Dressler, the 
underlying moral basis of self-defense is “the basic common law message that the 
taking of life should be an act of last resort.”4  In accordance with this principle, 
                                                                                                                            
*   George Butler Research Professor of Law and Co-Director, Health Law & Policy Institute, 
University of Houston Law Center.  I am grateful to Professor Joshua Dressler for his inspiring 
criminal law scholarship, and for his good humor in tolerating my criticism.  My thanks to Leslie 
Griffin, Ellen Marrus, Gerry Moohr, Laura Oren, Nancy Rapoport, Irene Rosenberg, Richard Saver, 
and Sandra Guerra Thompson for their suggestions regarding this Commentary, and to Librarian 
Peter Egler for his assistance.  For my earlier thoughts on some of these issues, see Joan H. Krause, 
Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 
FLA. L. REV. 699 (1994). 
1   Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 457 (2006). 
2   Id. at 458.  
3   Id. at 469. 
4   Id. at 471. 
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the use of deadly force in self-defense is permissible only when the actor 
reasonably believes it is necessary to protect herself from an imminent, unlawful, 
deadly attack.5  Dressler’s second assumption is that, as a factual matter, a battered 
woman who kills her abuser under nonconfrontational circumstances will never be 
able to establish that she faced such an objectively imminent threat.  From this, it 
follows that any attempt to characterize a battered woman’s nonconfrontational 
killing as justifiable can succeed only by, in essence, making a mockery of the 
doctrine’s moral underpinnings.  Finally, in positing that the excuse of duress is a 
better fit for such defendants, Dressler assumes as a practical matter that jurors will 
be competent to assess whether or not a battered woman acted as a “person of 
reasonable firmness” would have acted under the circumstances, without the need 
for expert testimony.  The goal of this Commentary is to demonstrate that each of 
these core assumptions is flawed in an important way.6   
As an initial matter, it is useful to understand just how rarely this issue arises.  
In reality, few battered women kill their abusers, and fewer still do so in 
nonconfrontational situations.  While it is difficult to identify all such homicides, a 
comprehensive study of appellate cases from 1902 to 1991 in which female 
defendants claimed to have killed their abusive domestic partners in self-defense 
estimated that 20% of such killings (roughly 45 cases) were nonconfrontational, 
with 8% (roughly 18 cases) involving sleeping victims.7  These figures are roughly 
consistent with a more recent study of self-defense cases between 1979 and 1999 
in which imminence was at issue, which found that approximately 9% of such 
killings were committed by battered women in nonconfrontational settings.8  While 
Dressler suggests that these numbers may be underinclusive,9 the available 
research indicates that most battered women who kill do so in the midst of a 
confrontation. 
With regard to Dressler’s first assumption regarding the moral basis of self-
defense, while the preservation of life is indeed one of the foundations of the 
doctrine, there are competing philosophical theories that accord the abuser’s 
interests significantly less weight than those of his victim.  In terms of Dressler’s 
core factual assumption, the assessment of whether a sleeping abuser constitutes an 
                                                                                                                            
5   See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.01[B], at 237 (4th ed. 2006). 
6   In a previous conversation, Professor Dressler characterized himself as “a pacifist who 
trusts the jury system.”  Unfortunately, I’m not and I don’t.  To the extent our disagreements are 
purely normative, then, we may find little common ground.  
7   Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current 
Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 394–97 (1991).  Maguigan identified 223 cases meeting 
her criteria, generating 270 opinions. 
8   V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1249, 1253 (2001). 
9   See Dressler, supra note 1, at 457 n.1 (noting that Maguigan’s study did not take into 
account acquittals, guilty pleas, pre-trial dismissals, or killings that were not prosecuted).  Moreover, 
in some unsolved nonconfrontational cases the perpetrator may in fact have been the decedent’s 
battered wife or girlfriend. 
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objectively imminent threat is confounded by imprecise definitions of the concept 
of imminence, by a reasonable person standard that is significantly less objective 
than it appears, and by confusion over the nature of the threat the battered woman 
is asked to predict.  Finally, as for Dressler’s faith that the jury will be able to 
resolve these issues without the help of expert testimony, the end result may be 
merely to refocus the jury on an issue that should be irrelevant to the inquiry: why 
didn’t the battered woman extricate herself from the relationship long before this 
point?  My position, ultimately, is that all the moral risks supposedly presented by 
battered women who kill in nonconfrontational circumstances are, instead, dangers 
inherent in the doctrine of self-defense.  We may decry these dangers or we may 
embrace them, but it is both incorrect and unfair to hold battered women to a 
higher standard than the doctrine requires.10 
 
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN 
 
To understand why battered women who kill their abusers have generated so 
much attention, one must first understand the basic contours of self-defense.  Self-
defense developed as a legal doctrine that, in limited circumstances, would render 
an otherwise criminal act of violence acceptable.  Under the traditional 
formulation, an actor may defend herself with deadly force only when she 
reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend against an imminent (or in 
some jurisdictions an “immediate”) unlawful threat of death or serious bodily 
harm.11  This belief must be both subjectively reasonable, in that the actor herself 
truly believes it, and objectively reasonable, in that a reasonable person would 
similarly so believe.  Self-defense generally is characterized as a justification, 
although there is some evidence that the defense originally functioned, at least in 
part, as an excuse at English common law.12  The distinction is not merely 
semantic: if the defense is viewed as an excuse, we focus on a particular actor’s 
lack of moral culpability for what is acknowledged to be an improper killing.  In 
contrast, construing the defense as a justification means that despite the legal 
prohibition against homicide, in this situation the killing “was right, or at least not 
wrong” 13—not just for this defendant, but for all those in similar circumstances.  
The choice of defensive theory also has implications for mistakes: while a 
reasonable error about the nature of the threatened harm may be justifiable, an 
                                                                                                                            
10  As Professor Victoria Nourse has argued, “it is time to stop blaming the downfall of the 
criminal law on subjectivity and the battered woman; she has not created new problems, but simply 
reminded us of the importance of resolving old controversies.”  Nourse, supra note 8, at 1294–95. 
11  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.04, at 539, 540–41, 544–46 (4th ed. 2003).  
12  See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on 
Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 26 (1986). 
13  DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 16.03, at 218–19. 
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unreasonable error is not, and thus can only excuse the actor (generally by 
reducing the charge to manslaughter).14 
For a battered woman who kills in nonconfrontational circumstances, the 
chief obstacles to proving self-defense are the requirements that she reasonably 
believe the threatened harm to be imminent, as the killing occurs in the absence of 
any ongoing physical attack.  As discussed below, at least on a theoretical level 
these barriers may not be insurmountable.  Practically, however, these challenges 
were the genesis of efforts to introduce expert testimony regarding BWS.  After 
years of working with battered women, Dr. Lenore Walker identified key elements 
of a syndrome that helps to explain how a woman might become trapped in an 
abusive relationship, and why killing her abuser might seem a reasonable course of 
action.  Walker described a three-stage escalating “cycle of violence” consisting 
of: (1) a “tension-building” stage, in which the woman suffers minor verbal or 
physical abuse and tries to prevent escalation; (2) the “acute battering incident”; 
and (3) “loving-contrition or absence of tension,” a relatively peaceful stage 
marked by the abuser’s remorse and the battered woman’s hope that the cycle will 
finally end.15  To explain why a woman who has experienced this cycle remains in 
the relationship, Walker posited that battered women suffer from “learned 
helplessness,” as a result of which “it becomes extraordinarily difficult for such 
women to change their cognitive set to believe their competent actions can change 
their life situation.”16  Over time, the periods of respite become shorter and the 
stages of tension and violence escalate—until, for some women, it becomes quite 
literally “kill or be killed.” 
As discussed below, Walker’s research has been extensively criticized for its 
methodological, cultural, and normative shortcomings.  Assuming for the moment 
that BWS paints an accurate picture of at least some battered women, however, 
how is it relevant to self-defense?  At trial, expert evidence concerning BWS is 
offered to help judges and jurors understand how the woman’s actions are 
reasonable (and hence justifiable) under the circumstances.  Dressler acknowledges 
that such evidence is relevant to two basic questions: why the defendant remained 
in the abusive relationship over time, and (less clearly) whether she herself truly 
believed that a sleeping or otherwise incapacitated abuser presented an imminent 
threat.17  Most controversially, this evidence has been used to explain how the 
                                                                                                                            
14  Id. § 18.03, at 249. 
15  Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 525, 531–
32 (1978). 
16  Id. at 529.  Walker adapted the theory of learned helplessness from the work of Dr. Martin 
Seligman, who found that laboratory animals subjected to random electrical shocks continued to 
behave passively even when later given an opportunity to avoid additional shocks.  Id. at 526.  See 
generally MARTIN E. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH (1975). 
17  Dressler, supra note 1, at 463.  Note that the testimony’s relevance to the first point, why 
the woman remained in the relationship, is something of a red herring in self-defense cases, as the 
defense does not impose a general duty on individuals to avoid potentially violent situations.  See 
Nourse, supra note 8, at 1284–85 (criticizing such a “pre-retreat” requirement). 
 
2007]        DISTORTED REFLECTIONS OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 
 
559
defendant’s actions satisfy the objective aspect of the reasonableness inquiry, a 
task made easier if she can be compared to a “reasonable battered woman” rather 
than the generic “reasonable person.”18  It is this third use of BWS evidence that 
most offends Dressler, and to which I now turn. 
 
III. IMMINENCE AND THE OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE PERSON 
 
If self-defense requires the actor’s reasonable belief in the existence of an 
imminent threat, the definitions of those terms become crucial.  “Imminence” has 
been defined as requiring the attack “to be almost immediately forthcoming.”19  In 
other words, we think of imminence as encompassing a traditional confrontation, 
where the actor responds almost instantaneously to a threatened attack.  An 
unprovoked knife fight, an armed home intruder, a mugger demanding money at 
gun-point on a darkened street corner—these we consider imminent threats.  When 
the purported assailant is asleep, however, it would appear this standard cannot be 
met.  Yet even at common law, the fact that an actor misperceives the immediacy 
of the threat may not be fatal to a claim of self-defense.  As noted above, the 
doctrine encompasses reasonable errors about imminence; it is only where the 
error is unreasonable that the defense is unavailable, and the actor must instead try 
to mitigate the severity of her crime through an imperfect self-defense excuse. 
The concept of a “reasonable” belief in imminent harm forms the crux of 
Dressler’s criticism of the battered woman’s defensive claim.  Dressler shapes his 
argument by using the facts of State v. Norman, a North Carolina case in which a 
woman who killed her long-time abuser while he slept raised a claim of self-
defense.20  After quoting the horrific facts of the case—which included more than 
20 years of physical abuse during which J.T. Norman forced his wife into 
prostitution to support the family, the fact that the violence escalated so much in 
the days prior to the killing that Judy Norman attempted suicide, and the fact that 
the police were called at least twice in the final 24 hours—Dressler concludes that, 
at the moment of his death, “[t]here is simply no basis for suggesting that J.T. 
                                                                                                                            
18  At least one court has adopted a highly subjective approach to reasonableness in a 
nonconfrontational battered woman case.  See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) 
(holding that defendant’s “actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of a person whose mental and 
physical characteristics are like the accused’s and who sees what the accused sees and knows what 
the accused knows.”). 
19  LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 10.04(d), at 544.  See also Dressler, supra note 1, at 461 
(defining imminence to mean “that the attack will occur momentarily, that it is just about 
underway.”).  Some jurisdictions, as well as the Model Penal Code, have broadened the formulation 
slightly to encompass “immediately necessary” killings.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1)(1985).  Even 
a broader formulation, however, requires the threat to occur in the present situation; it does not open 
the time frame to encompass temporally remote past or future threats. 
20  Dressler, supra note 1, at 459–61 (quoting State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1988)).  It is important to note—as Dressler does not—that Judy Norman ultimately lost her appeal.  
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). 
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Norman in reality represented an imminent threat to Judy Norman, as traditional 
law defines ‘imminence.’”21  Having rejected any possibility that her belief might 
have been accurate, Dressler then goes further: “It is hard to believe that she 
subjectively could believe this.  Indeed, if Judy Norman did believe, because of 
BWS, that her sleeping husband represented an instantaneous threat . . . [i]t should 
suggest that there was something wrong with Judy Norman’s psychological 
connection to reality.”22  Thus, not only does Dressler deny any possibility that 
Judy Norman confronted an objectively imminent threat, he asserts that only a 
mentally incapacitated person could even subjectively believe such a threat 
existed—and in the criminal law, compassion for those suffering from 
psychological infirmities is the province of excuse, not justification.  However, 
there are good reasons to question both the factual and philosophical bases for 
Dressler’s argument. 
 
A. Imminence 
 
Despite the long pedigree of self-defense, a surprising amount of confusion 
surrounds the key concept of “imminence.”  As a preliminary matter, it is unclear 
whether imminence functions primarily as an empirical standard or as a normative 
one.  The quoted definitions certainly suggest an empirical temporal question: we 
should simply look to the amount of time that elapsed between the decedent’s 
threat and the defendant’s response.  Ongoing confrontations should suffice, while 
attacks on incapacitated (albeit previously violent) individuals should not.  Yet 
case law suggests that this is not, in fact, how the concept of imminence often 
plays out. 
The best research to date comes from a detailed study by Professor Victoria 
Nourse, who examined “imminence-relevant” trial and appellate opinions between 
1979 and 1999.23  Contrary to the conventional assumption that imminence is a 
legal barrier to self-defense only when there is a significant time lag between threat 
and response, Nourse found that the vast majority of cases in which imminence 
was at issue—both in general (84%) and for battered women in particular (70%)—
involved facts that fit the model of a confrontation.24  Nourse concluded that 
imminence was often used by judges as a proxy for other concepts relevant to 
culpability, such as the severity and probability of the threat, the possibility that the 
actor could have avoided the killing by retreating, the actor’s fear of (rather than 
                                                                                                                            
21  Dressler, supra note 1, at 463–64.   
22  Id. at 464.  Dressler has made this point even more forcefully elsewhere, characterizing 
such defendants as “unable to appreciate objective reality.”  DRESSLER, supra note 5, at § 18.05[b][4], 
at 263. 
23  See Nourse, supra note 8, at 1249, 1252–55.   
24  Although cases involving battered women did constitute a higher percentage of 
nonconfrontational cases, nearly 40% of nonconfrontational cases involved male defendants.  Id. at 
1254. 
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malice toward) the decedent, and whether the decedent was the original aggressor.  
At first blush these results may be surprising, not only because they challenge the 
conventional wisdom regarding how imminence frames self-defense, but also 
because they raise the possibility that a supposedly temporal standard is 
determined instead by a host of non-empirical normative factors, some explicitly 
irrelevant to the legal inquiry.  Perhaps the prime example concerns retreat: in a 
jurisdiction that does not require the actor to retreat before responding with deadly 
force, using imminence as a proxy for retreat would have the effect of imposing 
that legal requirement through a back door.25 
On second thought, however, perhaps the use of imminence as a proxy for 
other culpability factors is not unexpected.  Indeed, for many commentators, “[t]he 
rationale underlying the imminence requirement is to ensure that the defendant’s 
use of defensive force was necessary.”26  Of course, this raises another question: 
necessary for what?  To this, Dressler has a ready answer: imminence functions to 
limit the types of violence that fall within self-defense, to assure that “the life of 
every person, even that of an aggressor, should not be terminated if there is a less 
extreme way to resolve the problem.”27  Nourse characterizes this as the “pacifist” 
view of necessity, a moral principle demanding that the actor “avoid violence at all 
costs.”28 
While the pacifist approach to necessity may be compelling from a normative 
perspective, it is not the only theory of necessity historically used to support the 
doctrine of self-defense.  As Nourse notes, if life preservation is the only value 
served by self-defense, we should expect to see jurisdictions uniformly require 
retreat before permitting the use of deadly force—a position at odds with current 
law.29  In fact, under an equally compelling “libertarian” theory of self-defense, the 
genesis of the doctrine is found instead in the right of each individual citizen to 
take “self-help” measures in response to unlawful aggression.30  From this 
                                                                                                                            
25  See id. at 1259.  Nourse found that battered women cases were more likely to invoke 
imminence as a proxy for the actor’s alternatives to killing, as well as for each party’s “relative 
responsibility” for the outcome.  Id. at 1263, 1265. 
26  Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 424 
(1988) (emphasis added).  The Model Penal Code adopts this approach explicitly, requiring that the 
use of defensive force be “immediately necessary . . . on the present occasion.”  MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 3.04(1) (2002).  Indeed, some have suggested completely replacing the concept of imminence with 
that of necessity.  See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making 
Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 279 (2002).     
27  Dressler, supra note 1, at 466 (emphasis in original).   
28  Nourse, supra note 8, at 1271. 
29  Id. at 1272–73.  See also DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 18.02[C], at 243–46 (noting that a 
“slim majority” of jurisdictions require no retreat by non-aggressors before they respond with deadly 
force, and that even jurisdictions with retreat rules generally recognize a “castle doctrine” exception 
when the attack occurs in the actor’s dwelling). 
30  Nourse, supra note 8, at 1274.  Dressler has recognized the existence of competing and 
inconsistent bases for justification defenses, including the principle of moral forfeiture.  See 
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alternative perspective, a battered woman who engages in self-help against her 
abuser, when all other measures have failed, might have a strong justification claim 
even under nonconfrontational circumstances.   
Moreover, even a pacifist approach to necessity does not dictate that 
imminence function as the predominant criterion.  Other elements of the 
doctrine—indeed, perhaps all of them—perform similarly life-affirming functions, 
yet they have not been treated as sacrosanct.  Again, the example of retreat is 
instructive.  In recent years, several jurisdictions that had required retreat before 
the use of defensive force have loosened that requirement, at least at the margins, 
by recognizing a “castle” exception in the defendant’s home or by revoking earlier 
exceptions that required retreat in the home if the assailant was a co-dweller.31  
Despite clearly expanding the universe of legally permissible deaths, such 
marginal changes to retreat requirements have not been widely criticized as 
rocking the foundations of the doctrine.  In fact, although far more controversial, 
several states recently have enacted so-called “shoot first” laws that permit the 
preemptive use of deadly force against intruders and extend the castle exception to 
virtually any location in which the defendant has a right to be present, thus 
abolishing retreat in many public places as well.32  Far from reinforcing the 
primacy of the pacifist approach, these efforts suggest that the libertarian basis for 
self-defense may well be the predominant one today—at least where battered 
women are not involved. 
Furthermore, Dressler’s key factual assumption—that it is never reasonable 
(or even credible) for a battered woman to believe a sleeping abuser presents an 
imminent threat—is questionable.  One of the conceptual problems with self-
defense is that it asks an unanswerable question: what would have happened had 
the defendant not responded with deadly force?  Dressler makes much of the fact 
that until the moment of attack is upon her, the battered woman cannot be certain 
of what will transpire—and the longer the gap between the active threat and her 
deadly response, the less certain it is that she would have been killed by her abuser, 
at least in the short term.  As Dressler argues, “[t]o suggest that a battered woman 
should be able to kill today because sooner or later the batterer will inevitably kill 
                                                                                                                            
DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 17.02, at 222–25.  Although rejected by Dressler, this common law 
principle would view the abuser as having forfeited his right to life due to his inhumane and unlawful 
actions against his victim. 
31  See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 245–46 (explaining castle doctrine); Weiand v. State, 
732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999) (reversing prior Florida law by finding no duty to retreat from residence 
before resorting to self-defense against co-occupant). 
32  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2005) (permitting broad use of self-defense, 
without retreat, in places where the defendant has a lawful right to be, and against persons who 
unlawfully and forcibly enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle); Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand 
Right to Shoot in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at A1 (describing laws).  Some defense 
lawyers characterize this as an “SOB needed killing” defense.  Tresa Baldes, ‘Shoot First’ Laws Hit 
Courtrooms, NAT. L.J., July 3, 2006, at 25 (quotation omitted). 
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her strikes me as unacceptable.”33  By focusing the inquiry on the battered 
woman’s belief that her abuser is about to kill her, however, Dressler imposes a 
legal requirement beyond what the doctrine demands.  While it is true that self-
defense is appropriate only for one facing the unlawful exercise of “deadly force,” 
it is important to remember that such force includes attacks likely to cause either 
death or serious bodily harm.34  Rather than asking whether the battered woman 
reasonably believes that she will be killed, then, the proper question is whether she 
reasonably believes she will suffer serious bodily harm.  Her reasonable belief in 
imminent serious injury should be enough for her to be able to invoke self-defense, 
even if she does not believe the attack is likely to take her life. 
There is ample literature to suggest that a battered woman may in fact be 
accurate in predicting an imminent threat of such harm from a sleeping abuser.  
According to this literature, out of sheer instinctual self-preservation a battered 
woman must become highly sensitive to her abuser’s behavior, and must learn to 
read the cues of an impending attack.  Moreover, it is not quite accurate to say that 
a sleeping abuser poses no threat.  Unless actually comatose, a sleeping abuser is 
merely seconds away from being an awakened abuser—and research demonstrates 
that abusers (particularly when intoxicated) tend to sleep lightly, demand that their 
partners be present when they awaken, and resume the abuse immediately.35  Is it 
truly unreasonable for a woman who has repeatedly experienced the violent 
aftermath of her abuser’s naps to believe that the next severe attack is about to 
begin?36  
The wholesale refusal even to entertain the idea that the battered woman’s 
assessment of the threat might be accurate is particularly striking in light of 
evidence that the average person is not very good at predicting violence.  As 
Dressler notes elsewhere, research suggests that even trained mental health 
professionals are apt to over-predict the future dangerousness of offenders, and the 
rate of false positives for untrained laypersons could well be much higher.37  But 
                                                                                                                            
33  Dressler, supra note 1, at 467. 
34  See LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 10.04 at 540–41. 
35  By way of loose analogy, as parents of infants well know, a sleeping baby is merely 
seconds away from being a screaming baby.  Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to describe my 
daughter’s afternoon nap as an “imminent meltdown”—one that my husband and I may be uniquely 
qualified to predict.   
36  See Walker, supra note 15, at 525 (describing hypervigilance and dangers posed when 
abuser awakens).  The facts of the Norman case fit this model: J.T. forced Judy Norman to lie on the 
floor while he slept on the bed, and she left his side only to make sure her granddaughter’s crying 
wouldn’t wake him.  State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1989). 
37  Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters: Reflections on 
Maintaining Respect for Human Life while Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: 
DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART  259, 275 & n.84 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002).  See 
also Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 110–17 (1984) 
(describing studies); Jeremy Horder, Killing the Passive Abuser: A Theoretical Defence, in CRIMINAL 
LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART  283, 293 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 
2002) (discussing the “personal significance” of such predictions for battered women).  Of course, it 
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these statistics do not take into account the fact that the battered woman is not a 
disinterested observer trying to assess her partner’s predilection for violence in the 
abstract; she is simply trying, based on her own violent experiences, to predict 
whether or not she is in danger of serious injury.  Although a full discussion of the 
social science evidence is beyond the scope of this Commentary, there may well be 
good reason to suspect that the battered woman’s ability to predict this particular 
danger is far better than that of the average person (or indeed the average juror).  
At the very least, it should be clear that an irrebuttable presumption that her belief 
is always wrong is no more defensible than a presumption that she is always 
correct.  In short, an analysis that asks the right question—whether this particular 
battered woman had a reasonable belief that she faced the imminent use of force by 
her abuser, capable of causing her serious bodily harm—may well come to a 
different conclusion than Dressler assumes. 
 
B. Objectivity 
 
Of course, assessment of the battered woman’s belief in imminent harm is not 
performed in the abstract.  The vast majority of jurisdictions require not simply the 
defendant’s good faith belief that the use of defensive force was necessary, but also 
that an objectively reasonable person would have so believed.  If the only person 
who could accurately predict the impending violence is another battered woman—
or perhaps this battered woman, knowing all she does about this abuser—it would 
appear to be impossible to satisfy an objective standard.  Once again, however, the 
battered woman who kills in nonconfrontational circumstances is not as far from 
the norm as may first appear. 
An ample literature documents that the model of the “reasonable person” has 
never been quite as objective as its name suggests.  In fact, the prevailing 
definition is significantly more contextual than many, including Dressler, are 
willing to credit.  As Professor Kit Kinports notes, the reasonable person is neither 
an ethical ideal nor the lowest statistical common denominator of what most 
people would do under the circumstances.  Instead, the concept is a normative 
“measure of culpability” used to determine whether “conduct does not conform to 
that which we can fairly demand of each other.”38  To assess self-defense, even the 
most objective model of the reasonable person must incorporate some 
characteristics of the situation, including the parties’ relative sizes, strength, age, 
and physical disabilities, as well as prior acts or threats of violence.39  Rather than 
                                                                                                                            
does not take voluminous studies to tell most of us how bad we are at predicting violence: those of us 
who have ever known someone who turned out, to our surprise, to be a spousal or child abuser are 
familiar with the concept. 
38  See Kinports, supra note 26, at 412–13.   
39  See id. at 413–15 (discussing traditional admission of certain defendant traits under 
objective standard); LAFAVE, supra note 11, at § 10.04(b), 542 (same).  As Nourse notes, “[i]t is an 
open secret that courts adopt a self-defense standard that is both objective and subjective; as a 
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undercutting the validity of the standard, these rules merely recognize that the 
reasonable person does not exist in a vacuum.  In other words, the proverbial “man 
on the Clapham omnibus” is asked to make his determination not from the safe 
confines of his seat, but rather in the context of this altercation.40   
In nonconfrontational cases, a key obstacle to meeting this standard is the fact 
that evidence of the reasonableness of the defendant’s behavior has been framed as 
relevant only when viewed through the lens of BWS.  Although useful in some 
cases, BWS has proven to be extremely problematic as an empirical, cultural, and 
political model.  Indeed, it is not clear that BWS is in fact an accurate portrayal of 
many (let alone most) abused women.  As critics have noted, Dr. Walker’s 
research consisted of interviews with a small group of racially homogeneous 
battered women, and did not analyze differences between women who killed their 
abusers and those who did not.  From this, Walker generalized the three-stage 
cycle of violence and learned helplessness theories—creating a model that is 
culture-bound at best, and at worst may only reinforce stereotypes of female 
submissiveness.41   
In fact, many argue that the entire premise of BWS is fatally flawed: we 
neither can nor should try to identify a single model of “the battered woman.”  
Women are abused across the spectrum of race, cultural, and financial status.  
Some are financially dependent on their abusers; some are financially independent 
job-holders; others, such as Judy Norman, are forced to support their abusers by 
engaging in degrading and illegal activities.  Limiting expert testimony to women 
who fit an unrealistic model invites convictions on the basis that a defendant 
simply wasn’t a “good” battered woman—a particular risk in homicide cases, as 
the act of killing seems inconsistent with claims of helplessness.42 
                                                                                                                            
doctrinal matter, then, there simply is no debate, except at the margins.”  Nourse, supra note 8, at 
1295; see also Burke, supra note 26, at 287–88, 291 (noting falsity of objective-subjective dichotomy 
and arguing in favor of a “contextualized” standard). 
40  Indeed, it sometimes appears that the objectively reasonable person is being conflated with 
the “reasonable bystander,” another concept used to illustrate these ideas.  The idea of a third party 
such as a policeman, who comes upon the altercation and must make a decision as to which party to 
aid, is a powerful one used to illustrate the limits of justification defenses.  See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, 
New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s 
Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 95–98 (1984) (analyzing third party’s right to 
intervene as derivative of the actor’s own justification).  Unlike the bystander, however, the 
reasonable person need not be unfamiliar with the facts of the situation.  
41  For particularly salient criticism of the BWS model, see, e.g., Mary Becker, Access to 
Justice for Battered Women, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 68–72 (2003) (describing more recent 
research); Burke, supra note 26, at 232–47 (extensively criticizing BWS as applied to self-defense); 
Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 70–87 (1994) (criticizing Walker’s 
“patriarchal” research); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of 
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 529–35 (1992) 
(criticizing “essentialism” of narrow definitions of battered women). 
42  See Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered 
Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 173–77 (2004) (noting that an “active 
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Moreover, the vision offered by BWS is one of dysfunction.  Much of the 
problem may be due to the characterization of BWS as a “syndrome.”  The 
invocation of a medical-psychological model may have hastened the acceptance of 
BWS expert testimony by judges, but it did so at the expense of women’s 
rationality: trapped by the cycle of violence, the BWS victim mistakenly believes 
that she is helpless to change her situation and thus fails to comprehend viable 
alternatives that would be obvious to the average person.  While advocates argue 
that the syndrome functions merely as a short-hand mechanism to convey general 
characteristics to a judge or jury, critics charge that it instead “defines the woman 
as a collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, and behavioral 
abnormalities . . . [who] lack[s] the psychological capacity to choose lawful means 
to extricate themselves from abusive mates.”43  Viewed in this light, the woman 
suffering from BWS is, by definition, most assuredly not acting as a reasonable 
person.  Where BWS exculpates, then, it does so only by playing on our sympathy 
for the battered woman’s situation—and as Dressler makes clear, compassion is 
not an adequate basis for justification.44 
In part, the difficulty may lie in conflating BWS with the battered woman, in 
confusing an analytical construct with the reality of an individual woman’s life.  If 
the objectively reasonable person is inherently (albeit marginally) contextual, 
rather than purely abstract, the task facing the battered woman who kills under 
nonconfrontational circumstances should be simply to convince the jury that she 
acted as a normal person would in this extreme situation.  As Professor Alafair 
Burke argues, battered women are “rational actors choosing among options that are 
limited by their factual circumstances.”45  Factors that might be relevant to how a 
reasonable person would react to repeated abuse, for example, include: the extent 
of prior violence; threats of impending violence that give credence to the battered 
woman’s perception of imminent serious harm; prior unsuccessful attempts to seek 
assistance from family, friends, law enforcement, and government agencies; 
whether the defendant has a job or other financial resources; whether the defendant 
has children and, if so, any means to care for them; and whether the defendant has 
a safe place to go.  Far from being specific to battered women, however, this basic 
information is relevant to “how ordinary people . . . tend to think and act in a 
certain kind of exceptional situation.”46  None of these factors will be 
                                                                                                                            
survivor” theory offers a better explanation of why a battered woman is able to overcome her 
helplessness and kill her abuser). 
43  Coughlin, supra note 41, at 7. 
44  Dressler, supra note 1, at 464–66.  Moreover, as a practical matter, relying on BWS 
testimony to defend against a homicide prosecution may have collateral disadvantages, particularly in 
custody decisions.  See Schneider, supra note 41, at 556–57 (explaining how BWS evidence can be 
used to support a finding that a woman is incapable of caring for her children). 
45  Burke, supra note 26, at 266. 
46  Horder, supra note 37, at 295.  See also Burke, supra note 26, at 266 (describing potentially 
relevant information); Nourse, supra note 8, at 1291 (urging that we rethink BWS “as a set of 
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determinative, and each juror may weigh them differently.  But the key is to 
understand that this is the type of information that jurors frequently consider in 
assessing a defendant’s actions and mental state.  If this information is framed as 
traditionally admissible evidence about the circumstances of, and parties to, a 
crime, rather than special considerations that are relevant only when viewed in 
light of BWS, the objective-subjective debate loses much of its force.  Battered 
women, it turns out, may be no more than average people facing horrific 
circumstances the rest of us pray we never encounter. 
 
IV. DURESS AND THE ROLE OF THE JURY 
 
Having rejected any possibility that a battered woman who kills in 
nonconfrontational circumstances might be acting as an objectively reasonable 
person would in a similar situation, Dressler offers a different solution to the 
problem based on the excuse of duress.  In Dressler’s view, what is needed is a 
way to explain that women like Judy Norman lack the “fair opportunity” to 
conform their actions to the law.  Dressler proposes that this be accomplished 
through statutes similar to the MPC’s duress defense, which applies: 
 
if a person is coerced to commit a crime—including murder—as the 
result of prior use of unlawful force upon the person . . . and/or imminent 
or non-imminent threats by the aggressor to use unlawful force upon the 
person in the future, if a person of reasonable firmness in the actor’s 
situation would have been unable to resist committing the crime.47 
 
Because defendants will be measured against the “person of reasonable firmness” 
rather than a helpless woman suffering from BWS, Dressler believes the jury 
should be able to apply its own normative standards, without the need for expert 
psychological testimony.48 
Dressler’s proposal offers many advantages over the current approach.  
Characterizing the battered woman’s claim as one based on a lack of fair 
opportunity allows us to reaffirm her rationality while still expressing our dismay 
at the resulting loss of life.  By focusing on an external impediment to her free 
choice (i.e., the abuser), rather than the internalized dysfunction of learned 
helplessness, duress allows us to excuse the battered woman’s actions without 
“pathologizing” her perceptions.  Moreover, the doctrine permits us to 
acknowledge that society as a whole plays a role in denying battered women fair 
opportunities by failing to provide the law enforcement services, shelters, and 
                                                                                                                            
relatively innocuous and perhaps necessary normative propositions”).  Dressler agrees that these 
questions are appropriate, but only in the context of an excuse.  See Dressler, supra note 1, at 470. 
47  Dressler, supra note 1, at 470 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09). 
48  Id. at 470. 
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financial assistance needed to enable victims to escape their situations.49  A duress 
defense would force society to take responsibility for allowing the situation to 
escalate, and perhaps thereby spur the development of improved assistance 
programs. 
Despite these advantages, however, Dressler’s proposal suffers from serious 
flaws.  The most obvious problem, as Dressler admits, is that such a defense is not 
recognized under current law.  Few jurisdictions have followed the MPC: duress 
generally is limited to situations in which an innocent party is coerced into 
committing a crime against a third party, rather than striking back against the 
coercer, and the defense cannot be invoked for homicides.  Thus, without 
significant alteration, it is unlikely that current duress law would assist a battered 
woman charged with killing her abuser.50   
A deeper problem, however, is that relying on duress might not avoid many of 
the problems raised by BWS.  As Dressler has conceded elsewhere, the basic 
concept of an “excuse” is somewhat pejorative in nature.51  Moreover, duress is 
unusual even within the universe of legal excuses.  Unlike a paradigmatic excuse 
such as insanity, where the defendant loses her ability to appreciate and/or control 
her conduct, the defendant who acts under duress unequivocally retains the ability 
to choose her course of action—and she chooses incorrectly, albeit for 
understandable reasons.52  Indeed, in his earlier writings Dressler criticized the 
drafters of the MPC for treating duress essentially as an incapacity defense, similar 
to insanity, by requiring that a person of reasonable firmness be incapable of 
resisting the coercion.53  Given this inconsistent pedigree, it is not clear that a 
                                                                                                                            
49  See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother?  Redefining, Reconstructing, 
and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 
102–06 (1999) (offering examples of systemic state failures to intervene in battering relationships).  
Because it does not rely on the battered woman’s “sickness,” but rather views her as “a person of 
reasonable firmness,” duress might also counteract some of the negative repercussions for battered 
women in custody disputes.  See supra note 44, and accompanying text. 
50  Dressler, supra note 1, at 470–71 & n.31.  One response to this problem, of course, is to ask 
that attorneys advocate for changes to current law that would make this defense feasible, similar to 
successful efforts to admit BWS testimony.  Id. at 471 n.33.  But asking advocates to abandon current 
strategy for an untried theory—all to appease law professors—is unlikely to be a winning argument.  
Moreover, to the extent that even traditional duress cases have thus far been less hospitable to BWS 
testimony than self-defense cases, this might be a difficult battle.  See Burke, supra note 26, at 247–
66 (noting unsuccessful attempts to invoke BWS in duress cases, despite the better factual fit). 
51  See Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses 
and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 672 (1988) (noting that excuse “says something 
less complimentary about the wrongdoer or, in some cases, about humanity in general”).  See also 
Coughlin, supra note 41, at 14–15 (describing “disabilities” that give rise to excuse). 
52  Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its 
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1360, 1365 (1989) (noting the unusual normative basis for 
duress). 
53  Dressler, supra note 51, at 708–10.  
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reconstructed duress defense would avoid implicating concepts of female 
incapacity and irrationality. 
Moreover, I remain unconvinced that jurors, left to their own devices, can 
adequately assess such evidence.  Because “reasonable firmness” functions as a 
normative standard, Dressler believes jurors will be able to make this assessment 
merely as laypersons: how much moral firmness could we truly expect of someone 
in this extreme situation?54  As an initial matter, we must ask whether the “person 
of reasonable firmness” who acts under duress is significantly different from the 
“reasonable person” acting in self-defense.  Indeed, it is unclear exactly what 
“reasonable firmness” means under the MPC.  To the extent the jury is asked to 
compare the battered woman’s actions to those of a hypothetical “person of 
reasonable firmness,” this suggests an objective standard.  The normative aspects 
of the defense, however, invite jurors to apply a gut-level sense of what they might 
do in a similar situation—suggesting the standard requires nothing more than a 
subjective “there but for the grace of God go I” assessment.55  Moreover, to the 
extent the traditional reasonable person in self-defense is not as abstractly 
objective as would first appear, the gap between these standards narrows 
considerably.  Jurors have always made assessments of reasonableness based on 
what they, personally, believe—that is, after all, the basis of using reasonable 
laypersons as fact-finders.  To expect jurors to reach vastly different results under 
an even more nebulous approach to reasonableness may simply be asking too 
much.  
Even if defined with precision, the “person of reasonable firmness” standard 
will not necessarily focus the jurors on the issues most relevant to assessing the 
battered woman’s culpability.  To put it bluntly, if judges and jurors inherently 
were able to understand the exigencies of these situations, advocates would never 
have needed to introduce evidence of BWS in the first place.  Indeed, the fact that 
the majority of failed self-defense claims by battered women involve killings that 
occur during traditional confrontations, rather than under nonconfrontational 
circumstances, suggests how difficult it is to move beyond longstanding 
assumptions about gender roles in violent relationships.  As Professor Nourse 
notes, “[b]attered woman cases are in general not seen as ‘real fights’ . . . . [and] 
courts and commentators have trouble seeing confrontational cases as 
confrontational because of their normative assumptions about what the parties’ 
                                                                                                                            
54  Dressler, supra note 52, at 1345. 
55  As Professor Markus Dubber notes, “Just what reasonable firmness is, and whether I 
displayed whatever it is, would be left up to the jury, the general receptacle of reasonableness in 
American criminal law.”  MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 257 (2002).  
Dressler suggests that most jurors would view themselves as surpassing the reasonable firmness 
standard, believing they would not have made the same choice as the defendant (although they would 
have understood the all-too-human temptation).  Interestingly, one of my colleagues had the opposite 
reaction: she believed the standard refers to a person who is morally much stronger than most people, 
including most jurors, would believe themselves to be.  This suggests that the definitional problem 
would need to be resolved before the standard would be viable in a courtroom. 
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relationship entails.”56  For that reason alone, a standard that enshrines those 
assumptions anew should be avoided. 
For a battered woman who kills her abuser, the most problematic assumption 
involves the question of why she remained in the abusive relationship.  In other 
words, why didn’t she leave—if not years earlier, at least before the violence 
escalated?  Yet even in jurisdictions that require retreat prior to the use of deadly 
force, retreat only becomes necessary once a confrontation arises.  There is no 
general duty under self-defense law to avoid altercations by “pre-retreating” from 
situations where violence may occur, whether the defendant is a woman who fears 
abuse or a shop-owner who runs a business in a dangerous neighborhood.  But as 
Nourse’s research demonstrates, it has been extremely difficult to disabuse judges 
and jurors of this notion.57 
Rather than resolving the issue, it appears that a duress defense would accord 
this inquiry an even more central role.  Applying the no-fair-opportunity standard 
to the Norman facts, Dressler notes that the central question for the jury would be 
whether Judy Norman could “have avoided the situation by walking out the 
door.”58  To answer that, the jurors would have to ask themselves additional 
questions about her options, including what would have become of the Normans’ 
children had she left (unclear), where she would have gone (also unclear, because 
J.T. had terrorized her extended family), how she would have supported herself 
(other than as a prostitute, we assume), whether J.T. would nonetheless have found 
her (as he had on previous occasions), and whether she could have turned to the 
police for assistance (which she did, to no avail, several times in the days before 
the killing)—questions that even Dressler admits might well weigh in her favor.   
The problem is that all of these questions are ones that advocates for battered 
women have been trying to get judges and juries to ask for years, a quest that was 
successful only with the introduction of expert testimony about BWS.  In fact, the 
much-maligned theory of learned helplessness is only one explanation for why a 
woman doesn’t leave.  Advocates have also documented the failure of law 
enforcement to offer assistance, the lack of shelters to house battered women who 
flee their homes (especially those with young children), and the lack of economic 
opportunities and legal assistance for women once they do leave.59  Moreover, 
sociological research makes clear that leaving is often not a safe option.  The 
woman’s attempt to break free from the relationship often spurs the abuser to 
escalate the level of violence, sometimes fatally—a documented phenomenon 
known as “separation assault.”60  In short, there is abundant evidence of very good 
                                                                                                                            
56  Nourse, supra note 8, at 1286. 
57  Id. at 1284 (discussing how imminence can be used as a proxy to require a woman to “pre-
retreat” from the relationship). 
58  Dressler, supra note 1, at 470. 
59  See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 73–83 (explaining challenges). 
60  See Burke, supra note 26, at 267–73 (noting dangers and explaining why the choice to stay 
may be a rational one); DIANE CRAVEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SPECIAL 
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reasons—physical, financial, and psychological—why battered women remain in 
these relationships.  Yet the mere fact that the question is still asked suggests that 
the results of this research are not intuitive.  And the only way this information has 
been successfully conveyed to judges and juries has been through the use of expert 
testimony, which Dressler’s proposal would disallow.   
By refusing to permit expert testimony about the context of the battering—not 
necessarily in the guise of BWS, but at least from someone with professional 
expertise—I fear we simply will invite jurors to rely on their inaccurate 
assumptions about battered women defendants.  Perhaps the problem is that any 
attempt to define a defense that fits all battered women can be criticized as falling 
into the trap of essentialism.  BWS certainly does so, recasting the woman’s 
identity as merely the sum of the abuse perpetrated upon her.  By denying battered 
women rationality while seeking ways to absolve them of liability, however, 
Dressler’s proposal does much the same: it continues to conflate “the battered 
woman” as a theoretical construct with the facts of an individual case.  I believe 
the best way to resolve this disagreement is not to create new syndromes or 
defenses, but simply to let those facts speak for themselves. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
I share Professor Dressler’s concerns regarding the coarsening of our moral 
values regarding human life, and his reluctance to embrace ever-expanding 
concepts of self-defense.  But I differ in how much of the blame I am willing to 
assign to battered women for the current state of affairs.  The problems raised by 
nonconfrontational killings are not unique to battered women, but in truth are 
inherent in our fragmented approach to the use of deadly defensive force.  The 
doctrine’s disparate and conflicting philosophical underpinnings—ranging from 
pacifist to libertarian to moral forfeiture—suggest that no moral imperative 
commands the battered woman to risk life and limb to give her abuser the ultimate 
benefit of the doubt.  It is one thing for us to hope, as a moral matter, that a 
battered woman will turn the other cheek.  For the law to require her to do so—
literally upon pain of death—is quite another matter indeed. 
Finally, I confess that the legal academy’s fascination with homicides by 
battered women has always been something of a mystery to me.  Despite the 
prevalence (or recalcitrance) of domestic violence, the vast majority of battered 
women do not kill their abusers, and very few do so in nonconfrontational 
circumstances.61  Dressler suggests that these numbers may be higher, and perhaps 
                                                                                                                            
REPORT: SEX DIFFERENCES IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1994, 4 (Sept. 1997) (noting “dramatically 
elevated” rate of violence against separated women). 
61  Nor does it appear that the number of such killings is increasing—not even in Texas, where 
the late Ann Richards once quipped that “the price of gasoline has gotten so high that Texas women 
who want to run over their husbands have to carpool.”  Molly Ivins, Bucking the Texas Lockstep, 
WASH. POST, May 15, 2003, at A29.  
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he is right.  But if we believe these statistics to be underinclusive, we similarly 
might question recent estimates of the numbers of women who are killed by their 
partners.  According to the Department of Justice, wives constituted an astounding 
81% of all persons killed by their spouses in 2002, and girlfriends were 71% of all 
victims killed by a boyfriend or girlfriend.62  I do not mean to make light of the 
moral dangers of a criminal justice system that compassionately but incorrectly 
allows battered women to cloak vengeance in the guise of self-defense.  But the 
fact that wives and girlfriends are killed by their husbands and boyfriends at a rate 
of roughly four to one—despite years of efforts to eradicate domestic violence—
suggests to me a far greater problem with the moral state of the criminal law. 
                                                                                                                            
62  MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE 
OF JUST. PROGRAMS, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND 
ACQUAINTANCES 18 (June 2005).  These numbers may well be low, as the relationship between 
victim and killer was ascertained in only 9,102 of the 16,204 non-negligent homicides that year. 
